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Abstract
It has been reported in the media that bid rigging is commonly practised in almost 
all public works projects in Japan. It was also said that the Japanese anti-trust author-
ity, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), was a watchdog that did not bite, in 
spite of having a long history of enforcement since 1947. However, the situation is 
significantly changing because the Japanese Antimonopoly Act was amended in 2005 
to greatly strengthen anti-trust enforcement. The JFTC has already succeeded in 
cracking down against bid rigging committed by big and famous companies under 
the new Act. For the present, the Japanese business community has to seriously ad-
dress compliance problems. Can the AMA change the business community?
 
1 Introduction 
Anti-trust laws have been increasingly common rules among jurisdictions the world 
over regardless of their stage of development. The International Competition Network 
(ICN), which provides competition authorities with a specialised yet informal venue for 
addressing practical competition concerns, was established in 2001. The original members 
consisted of 14 jurisdictions including big economies such as the United States, the EU 
and Japan. Now the members have increased to over 100 jurisdictions. Although one big 
new economy, the People’s Republic of China, has not joined the ICN yet, it introduced 
a comprehensive anti-trust law called the Antimonopoly Law in 2007 after a more than 
10-year drafting process. Russia held the ICN 6th annual conference in Moscow in 2007. 
Even countries which adopted a command economy in the past have adopted a market-
driven approach and introduced competition laws to achieve a more efficient economy.
  Focusing on developed countries which have long experience of anti-trust laws 
enforcement, many countries have recently reviewed anti-trust laws to strengthen en-2
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forcement, notably to fight hard-core cartels. In 1998 the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  initiated  an  anti-cartel  program  with  the 
adoption of the Council1 ‘Recommendation Concerning Effective Action against Hard 
Core Cartels’. The Recommendation condemns hard-core cartels as the most egregious 
violations of anti-trust laws and focused on two topics: effectiveness of laws prohibiting 
hard-core cartels, and international co-operation in enforcing laws prohibiting hard-core 
cartels. It called upon member countries to ensure that their laws adequately prohibit 
such cartels and that they provide for effective sanctions, enforcement procedures, and 
investigative tools with which to combat them.2  The OECD Competition Committee 
also published the first comprehensive report about the ongoing fight against cartels in 
2000 and follow-up reports twice in 2003 and 2005. In addition to the above two topics, 
the report put emphasis on public awareness of the harm caused by hard-core cartels. In 
line with the OECD Recommendation, in order to fight hard-core cartels, new legislation 
has been introduced in many jurisdictions. Major changes are as follows:
The United States in 2004 increased maximum corporate criminal fines from $10 
million to $100 million, the maximum individual fine from $350,000 to $1 mil-
lion, and the maximum jail term from 3 to 10 years.
The European Commission has administrative fines and no criminal penalties. It 
adopted new Guidelines on the method of setting fines in 2006 with a view to 
increasing the deterrent effect of fines. Within the company’s 10 per cent total 
annual turnover, the revised Guidelines provide that fines may be based on up to 
30 per cent of annual sales to which the infringement relates, multiplied by the 
number of years of participation in the infringement.
The  United  Kingdom  in  2002  introduced  criminal  sanctions  for  individuals 
participating in cartels with a maximum jail sentence of 5 years by enacting the 
Enterprise Act.
Australia significantly amended the Trade Practices Act (TPA) in 2006 in accord-
ance with recommendations made by Dawson Committee in its report of 2003. 
In respect of  cartels, an increase in penalties is the most important among the 
amendments to the TPA. Beyond the previous maximum pecuniary penalty of $10 
million, corporations found in breach of the TPA can now alternatively receive 
punishment of up to three times the financial value of the anti-competitive act or, 
where the value of the breach is difficult to ascertain, 10 per cent of the value of 
the turnover of the body corporate and all related businesses, whichever of the 
three penalties is the greater. However, criminal penalties were not introduced.
Japan has also adopted epoch-making new legislation in 2005 that increased sur-







ity to the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) and changed the administrative 
hearing procedures.
  Japan was considered to be weak in enforcing anti-trust laws although it has a long 
history of anti-trust enforcement since the Antimonopoly Act (AMA) was enacted in 1947. 
It has been said that many hard-core cartels existed in Japan owing to weak enforcement. 
In particular, it is generally believed that Japanese bid rigging is still a habitual practice 
of the Japanese construction industry, although it is both a violation of Japanese criminal 
law and the AMA. The JFTC has long been criticised for operating as a watchdog which 
did not bark or bite, but the situation is changing after the 2005 amendment to the AMA 
was enacted. 
  Although the Japanese government recognised the importance of a market-driven 
economy and tried to strengthen anti-cartel enforcement, the situation did not change 
significantly until the Koizumi Government took office in 2001. Former Prime Minister 
Koizumi actively pursued structural reform during his administration. He said in his 2001 
inauguration speech that Japan had to establish a competition policy for the 21st century 
and strengthen the organisation of the JFTC. However, there has been strong opposition 
to the amendment to the AMA in the Japanese business community.
  Finally, in April 2005, with the Koizumi Government’s strong commitment to the 
promotion of competition as part of its structural reform, the AMA of Japan underwent 
its first comprehensive amendment in the last quarter century.  The amended act took 
effect in January 2006. The primary goal of this amended act is to eradicate hard-core 
cartels, which means anti-competitive activities such as price-fixing cartels and bid rigging, 
in a more active and stricter manner so as to contribute to achieving a vital, dynamic and 
robust economy and society.
  Among the specific provisions that were amended in 2005 is an increase in the 
principal surcharge rate imposed on violators of the AMA, from six per cent to 10 per 
cent of the related turnover for the larger-sized enterprises, and imposition of 50 per cent 
higher rates to repeated violators. In addition, the amended AMA introduced criminal 
investigation powers so that the JFTC could treat serious violations in a stricter and more 
effective manner, which is expected to enable the JFTC to file criminal referrals much 
more aggressively. A leniency program was introduced by the amendments as an alterna-
tive approach, granting 100 per cent immunity from surcharge for the first applicant, 50 
per cent reduction of surcharge to the second applicant, and 30 per cent reduction to the 
third applicant is afforded as long as they provide necessary information before the start 
of the JFTC investigation. Furthermore, in order to speed up its hearing procedures, the 
amended AMA abolished the recommendation system, under which the JFTC made a 
recommendation to a violator of the AMA and initiated ex ante hearing procedures after 4
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the violator rejected the recommendation.  Instead, the amendments introduced an ex post 
hearing procedure where a violator can lodge a complaint against a JFTC decision.
  With regard to the 2005 amendments, debate continued about the further necessity 
to discuss several fundamental issues, including whether or not the scope of infringement 
to be surcharged should be expanded and how the administrative hearing processes of 
JFTC should be conducted to ensure due process. In view of this debate, an Advisory 
Panel was established in the Cabinet Office in July 2005, consisting of 20 academics 
and representatives from the business and consumer communities. The panel vigorously 
examined these issues for two years and concluded their discussions in June 2007. In the 
light of their conclusions, which in principle approved the 2005 AMA amendments, the 
JFTC released new draft amendments to the AMA in October 2007. After discussing this 
draft, the Fukuda Government submitted a new bill to the Diet in March 2008, which 
mainly consists of two revisions to the current AMA. The first is to expand the scope of 
surcharges by imposing surcharges on a part of ‘unfair trade practices’ such as unjustifiably 
low sales prices and abuse of a dominant bargaining position under specific conditions. 
The second is to further strengthen surcharges in two ways, namely imposing a surcharge 
50 per cent higher against companies found to have played a leading role in AMA viola-
tions and extending the limitation of time to five years from the current three.3 
  After the amended AMA came into effect in January 2006, Japanese companies 
have a duty to comply strictly with the AMA despite the fact that hard-core cartels, and 
especially bid rigging, might be common throughout Japan. It was reported in the national 
press that top management of major general construction companies had decided to stop 
bid rigging in response to enforcement of the new AMA. 4 The Japan Civil Engineering 
Constructor’s Association5 also released a report on the reform of public procurement 
which said that constructors should cut their connection with old practices, including 
bid rigging, to restore public trust in the construction sector.6 In addition, three major 
construction business associations, namely the Japan Federation of Construction Contrac-
tors7, the Japan Civil Engineering Contractors' Association, and the Building Contractors 
Society8, issued notifications requiring the enhancement of corporate compliance by their 
member companies.
  Based on the current enforcement of the AMA, this paper aims to examine how 
the new AMA has affected Japanese companies’ behaviour, notably corporate compli-
ance. In other words, the purpose of this paper is to explore whether the new AMA and 
its enforcement have enough impact to change the Japanese business community. 5
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2 Basic Structures of the AMA and 2005 Amended Act 
The AMA was first enacted in 1947 when Japan was occupied by the Allied Occupation 
Forces. The Allies exerted a strong influence on the enactment. As a result, AMA was 
significantly influenced by US anti-trust laws, especially the Sherman Act, the Federal 
Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. Although the origin of the Japanese anti-
trust law came from U.S. laws, the AMA has developed independently from U.S. laws in 
accordance with Japanese business practices and has been influenced by the Japanese legal 
system, which is quite different from the common law system. This paper describes basic 
structures of the AMA and the 2005 amendments to the AMA item by item below. 
Substantive Regulations 
The Japanese AMA consists of regulations on three major anticompetitive activities and 
regulations on merger and acquisition.9 Those activities are ‘unreasonable restraint of 
trade’, ‘private monopolisation’ and ‘unfair trade practices’. The first two are prohibited 
by Article 3 and the last is prohibited by Article 19. It is generally said that ‘unreasonable 
restraint of trade’ stems from Section 1 of the Sherman Act, ‘private monopolisation’ 
stems from Section 2 of the Sherman Act and ‘unfair methods of competition’ stems from 
Section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act.
  Article 3 of the AMA prohibits ‘unreasonable restraint of trade’ and ‘private mo-
nopolisation. ‘Unreasonable restraint of trade’ is defined in Article 2 (6) to cover mutual 
restrictions of business activities of other firms by firms in concert with other firms, hav-
ing the effect of a substantial restraint of competition in the relevant market, contrary to 
the public interest. It has been interpreted to mean anti-competitive horizontal restraints 
including hard-core cartels such as price fixing and bid rigging.
  ‘Private monopolisation’ is defined in Article 2(5) to be exclusion or control by 
a firm, independently or in concert with other firms, of the business activities of other 
firms, having the effect of a substantial restraint of competition in the relevant market, 
contrary to the public interest. Exclusion means the case where other firms go out of 
existence through mergers and acquisitions, etc. or the case where new entrants are ex-
cluded. On the other hand, control refers to the imposition of constraints on other firms 
through, for instance, the acquisition of stock, the dispatch of officers, and the utilisation 
of a dominant bargaining position.  It can be considered to be close to abuse of market 
dominant position.
  Article 19 prohibited ‘unfair trade practices’. These are defined in Article 2 (9) as 
six patterns of conduct which tends to impede fair competition and which is designated 
by the JFTC.10 Pursuant to this article, in 1953 the JFTC designated nine specific defini-6
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tions of unfair trade practices for the first time and in 1982 replaced these by designating 
sixteen definitions in order to clarify each violation in more detail. These definitions have 
remained unchanged since then. They can be classified into the three broad categories. 
The first category consists of conduct which may restrain free competition, whose ex-
amples include refusal to deal, discriminatory pricing, unjustifiably low sales price, and 
resale price restrictions. The second category consists of conduct which in itself cannot 
be considered fair competition, the examples of which include customer enticement by 
deceptive methods or unjustifiable benefits and tie-in sales. The third category consists 
of conduct of large firms forcing unreasonable demands on trading partners by making 
use of dominant bargaining positions. In principle, these practices are not immediately 
deemed illegal. They are considered a violation only when they are likely to impede fair 
competition. 
  When we examine the relationship among the three regulations mentioned, it should 
be noted that the same actions may be regulated by the Article 3 or the Article 19, and 
the AMA has two standards of illegality, namely the substantial restraint of competition 
and the likelihood of impeding fair competition (or tendency to impede fair competition). 
It is generally considered that the likelihood of impeding fair competition sets a much 
lower standard than the substantial restraint of competition. The difference of illegality 
leads to that of penalties applied for actions in violation of the AMA. Regarding these 
substantive regulations, there were no changes in the 2005 amendments. 
Procedures 
The AMA also prescribes procedures for violations of the AMA, which was significantly 
changed in the 2005 amendment. Firstly, the paper describes the procedures before 
the amendment, which had been in operation since 1947 and were different from the 
procedures prescribed by other administrative laws. Secondly, the paper describes why 
the Japanese government introduced the current procedures, which are similar to other 
administrative procedures.
  When the JFTC concludes that alleged actions violate the AMA, it recommends 
that measures be taken to eliminate such actions.  A recommendation can include fact 
finding, an allegation of violation, and a cease and desist order. Any firm which has re-
ceived such a recommendation must notify the JFTC in writing without delay whether 
the firm will accept it. When the firm accepts it, the JFTC can issue a decision in line 
of the recommendation without initiating hearing. This is a simple procedure for cases 
without disputes. If the firm does not accept the recommendation, a hearing procedure, 
which is very similar to a trial procedure, is initiated by the JFTC. Hearing procedures 7
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are conducted so that the firm (the respondent) can contest the factual findings and the 
application of law prior to the JFTC issuing a decision. This is to ensure due process. 
Hearings are usually held before three administrative judges appointed by the JFTC. In 
this case, the respondent can ask the Commission for an opportunity to state their views 
directly to it. The Commission can approve decisions without correction, or can correct 
proposed decisions submitted by the administrative judges. The designating investiga-
tors seek to prove the actions violate the AMA, while the respondent seeks to counter 
this. After the completion of the hearing procedure, the JFTC issues a decision (‘hearing 
decision’) which describes the fact finding and orders the respondent to take corrective 
measures. The decision takes effect when a certified copy is served on the respondents. 
If the procedure for issuing a decision is expected to take much time and the actions in 
violation of the AMA cannot be ignored during the period, the JFTC can apply to the 
Tokyo High Court for an urgent injunction order. If the respondent does not accept the 
hearing decision, they can appeal against the decision to the Tokyo High Court which is 
an appeal court under ordinary administrative cases. In this regard, hearing procedures 
conducted by the JFTC are given a special position compared with those of other agen-
cies. There are also special rules in the court proceedings which were adapted for the 
JFTC procedures. One is the rule regarding substantial evidence, which means that fact 
findings made by the JFTC shall, if established by substantial evidence, be binding upon 
the court. The other is the rule that restricts submission of evidence, which means that an 
offer of new evidence relating to the facts found by the JFTC must be restricted. These 
rules, which are strongly affected by laws of the United States, remain unchanged after 
the 2005 amendment.
  Under ordinary Japanese administrative procedures, when an administrative agency 
finds that a violation exists, the agency does not make a recommendation but issues an 
administrative order. The agency can immediately enforce the order. Before issuing an 
administrative order, the agency must conduct a hearing, which is a simple procedure 
not open to the public, unlike a trial procedure. The respondent may bring an action to 
a district court, not to an appeal court, to annul the order. These mechanisms are based 
on the administrative procedures of civil law countries, which were imported into Japan 
during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912). On the other hand, the JFTC procedures 
are similar to the procedures of an independent administrative commission in the United 
States. The JFTC cannot enforce corrective measures until it issues a hearing decision, if 
the firm contests the fact findings and the application of law.
  Although the JFTC’s ex-ante hearing procedure has the advantage of securing due 
process by hearing a respondent’s claim sufficiently, it takes a good deal of time to com-
plete the hearing procedure. As a result, the JFTC cannot enforce the corrective measures 8
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quickly, whereby it could easily restore competition in the market. In fact, according to 
the JFTC, it took an average of 24 months in the past three years for hearing procedures 
to be completed.11 Furthermore, there was another problem with the JFTC’s time-con-
suming procedures. Before the 2005 amendment, a surcharge payment order could not 
be issued until a hearing decision was issued. Under the former system, if a respondent 
with a complaint against the hearing decision also claimed that the payment order should 
be corrected, another hearing concerning the payment order would begin. The JFTC said 
it took an average of 14 months for this hearing to be completed. According to those 
figures, it took 38 months, or more than three years, from the start of the first hearing 
to the issue of the payment order. In general, administrative procedures should be simple 
and speedy so that a respondent can get a quick answer from an administrative agency. 
In an economic field, such as where the AMA applies, a quicker response to a violation 
should be required so that competition would be restored as soon as possible. In the 
light of the foregoing considerations, the ex-ante hearing procedure has been changed 
to an ex-post hearing procedure to facilitate quicker restoration of competition. Under 
the current system, the JFTC can issue an administrative order (cease and desist order) 
and a surcharge payment order at the same time if it considers that an action in violation 
of the AMA exists, and can also enforce these orders immediately. On the other hand, 
a respondent can complain to the JFTC about an administrative order to begin ex-post 
hearing procedures. 
  Regarding the current system, the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren)12 
has argued that the current procedure is unfair because the JFTC plays both roles of a 
judge and a prosecutor despite the JFTC taking the place of district court.13 They are 
of the opinion that the JFTC hearing procedure should be abolished and a respondent 
should directly bring an action to a district court. This argument has much to do with 
power-sharing between a court and an independent administrative commission, but from 
the perspective of fairness a district court might be considered to be a proper agency for 
dealing with complaints. The new bill, submitted to the Diet in March 2008, provides 
that the current ex-post hearing procedures would be reviewed in the next amendment 
to the AMA after examining the roles of the JFTC from every aspect. 
Remedies 
There are several remedies provided by the AMA and Japan’s Civil Code. The most 
important is a cease and desist order, which is given to the relevant firm by the JFTC to 
transfer a part of his business, or to take any other measures necessary to eliminate acts 
in violation of the AMA. The JFTC has recently issued cease and desist orders including 9
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compliance measures. A violating firm is generally required to stop any actions in violation 
of the AMA, to confirm that it is stopping these actions through its board of directors, 
and to notify that it is stopping its actions to any business connections. In addition to 
these requirements, the JFTC has recently required a firm to improve its compliance by 
providing or revising a compliance program, educating its employees, conducting an audit 
on compliance regularly, and establishing an in-house notification system. In a bid-rigging 
case concerning steel bridge construction in 2005, which was led by the Japan Highway 
Public Corporation (JHPC), the JFTC required, in addition to the above, that the vio-
lating firms should remove the sales staff involved in the violation from sales activities 
concerning the JHPC, and that directors or employees working for the JHPC should not 
engage in sales activities involving the JHPC. 14 In this case, the JFTC went as far as to 
recommend a personnel reshuffle within the violating firms and its cease and desist order 
therefore had a strong impact on the firms. Reviewing these orders, the JFTC apparently 
placed heavy emphasis on corporate compliance to prevent repeated violations.
  The second remedy is single damage awards. While the US Clayton Act empowers 
an injured party to sue for trebled damage award, an injured person can sue for single 
damage under the AMA.15 Plaintiffs who sue under the AMA need not prove negligence 
or intention of the defendants, but they can sue only after the decision of the JFTC about 
illegal conduct becomes final and conclusive, and can bring the action for damages only 
to the Tokyo High Court. An injured person can also sue for actual damage under the 
general tort provision of Civil Code, which does not require any special treatment.16 
Considering these requirements, plaintiffs might choose the Civil Code. In fact, it is said 
that most of the plaintiffs bring the action for damages to a district court based on the 
Civil Code.17 
  The third remedy is injunctions. The provision of injunctive relief was introduced 
into the AMA in 2000 and took effect in April 2001.18 Any person whose interest is 
seriously injured or is likely to be seriously injured by acts in violation of Article 19 is 
entitled to seek the suspension or the prevention of the acts. The reason why injunctions 
are limited to the acts in violation of Article 19 relates not to the standard of illegality, 
but rather to the easiness of proof. A private party can easily prove an act in violation of 
Article 19 rather than an act in violation of Article 3. 
Surcharges 
The current Japanese surcharge can be considered to be an administrative fine like other 
countries’, but there are unique features in the Japanese surcharge system: The first is 
that the scope of surcharge is limited to cartels affecting price.19 The second is that the 10
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amount of surcharge is calculated by multiplying the sales of the relevant product by a 
fixed rate. The third is that the rate is provided by the AMA depending on the company’s 
business and size. In the 2005 amendment, the basic rate, which is applied for large-sized 
companies other than wholesalers and retailers, was raised to 10 per cent from six per cent 
after a big argument with business community. The fourth is that the AMA provides that 
repeated violators, which legally means a person ordered to pay a surcharge in the past ten 
years, shall be fined 50 per cent higher than the regular rate and violators who stopped 
violations one month earlier than the JFTC investigation shall be imposed 20 per cent 
lower than the regular rate. To summarise, there is no JFTC discretion as to whether the 
JFTC should impose a surcharge or as to what amount of surcharge should be imposed. 
Instead of the JFTC, the AMA provides the detailed schedule on the surcharge. There 
have been hot arguments about concurrence of surcharge and criminal fines, and about 
the level of surcharges. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Leniency Program 
A leniency program means the promise of lenient treatment, that is to exempt or reduce 
the fines to cartel participants who confess and provide evidence against their co-conspira-
tors. It has proved an effective measure to resolve the main difficulty of detecting and 
punishing cartels that are conducted in secret. Japan had not had a leniency program, 
unlike other advanced countries, but finally introduced it in the 2005 amendments. The 
current AMA prescribes that as long as the necessary information is reported before the 
JFTC investigation starts, the first applicant is granted 100 per cent immunity, the second 
is granted 50 per cent reduction, and the third is granted 30 per cent reduction. Even 
if an applicant reports after the JFTC investigation, as long as they are within the third 
category and they provide necessary information, they are granted 30 per cent reduc-
tion. As a leniency program was being introduced into Japanese legal system for the first 
time, some argued against its introduction. This will be examined in the section on the 
leniency program below.
Criminal Penalties 
The AMA originally contained criminal sanctions against acts in violation of Article 3, like 
the Sherman Act. Although all acts in violation of the Sherman Act can be punishable as 
a crime in the United States, only the acts in violation of Article 3, that is ‘unreasonable 
restraint of trade’ and ‘private monopolisation’ can be punishable as a crime under the 
AMA, and acts in violation of Article 19 cannot be punishable as a crime. This is because 
‘unfair trade practices’, which means the acts in the likelihood of impeding fair competi-11
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tion, has much lower illegality than the acts resulting in the substantive restraint of trade. 
However, in both countries, violations against which criminal sanctions are imposed have 
been practically limited to hard-core cartels. It should be noted that there has been only 
11 criminal cases in Japan from famous petrochemical products cartel cases in 1974, 
where the JFTC filed criminal referrals against the Petroleum Industry Federation for 
output restrictions and twelve oil companies for price fixing, to March 2008 and there 
were virtually two petrochemical cartel cases from 1947 when the AMA was enacted to 
1974.20 In respect of criminal cases between 1947 and 1998, according to Haley (2001) 
the most telling problem with criminal sanctions was atrophy, not lack of severity.21
  If the JFTC investigates an alleged violation and successfully establishes it as a 
criminal case, the JFTC can file a criminal referral with the Prosecutor General under 
the AMA. With regard to criminal referrals filed by the JFTC, there are three special 
provisions in the AMA not found in other administrative laws. The first is the exclusive 
authority for filing criminal referrals with the Public Prosecutor’s Office.22 Owing to this 
provision, the Public Prosecutor's Office can prosecute only when the JFTC officially 
files a criminal referral with it. The second is the provision for filing a criminal referral 
with the Prosecutor General while other agencies file criminal referrals to the District 
Office.23 These provisions remained unchanged after the 2005 amendments. The third 
was that the Tokyo High Court was the first court to deal with a criminal case.24 Since 
the Tokyo High Court corresponds to the Tokyo High Prosecutor’s Office, before the 
2005 amendment the Tokyo High Prosecutor’s Office conducted a criminal investigation 
with the District Prosecutor’s Office after the receipt of criminal referral. In the amend-
ments, the court of first instance was changed from the Tokyo High Court to the district 
courts. As a result, district prosecutor’s offices can easily conduct a criminal investiga-
tion into AMA violations. These provisions might be intended by original lawmakers to 
give the JFTC high prestige. However, they might lead to restriction of activities of the 
District Prosecutor’s Offices, especially the provision of court jurisdiction. The review of 
this provision is considered to have the desired effect as the District Prosecutor’s Offices 
have already conducted criminal investigations into violations of the AMA.
  There are no penal provisions against corporations in the Japanese Penal Code. Each 
regulation under any law, therefore, contains a penal provision for the criminal punishment 
of corporations. As for violations of the AMA, Article 89 prescribes that any individual in 
violation of Article 3 shall be punished by imprisonment with hard labour for not more 
than three years, or by a fine of not more than five million yen. Furthermore, Article 95 
provides that any corporation which employs the said individual in Article 89 shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than five hundred million yen. It should be noted that 
the Japanese criminal code punishes corporations not directly but indirectly through their 12
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supervision obligations, unlike the US criminal code. Under the Japanese Penal Code, it 
has long been considered that corporations do not commit crimes. On the other hand, 
it became necessary to punish corporations as corporations came to play an important 
role in economic activities. In order to address this problem, each regulation under any 
law punishes corporations through their supervision obligations, which is considered to 
be their liability for any negligence.25  As mentioned, each regulation under any law has 
a common provision about corporations’ criminal liability, but the AMA, in addition, 
has a unique provision about a representative’s criminal liability. Article 95-2 prescribes 
that a corporation’s representative who has failed to take necessary measures to prevent 
or rectify a violation, despite knowledge of such a violation, shall be punished by a fine 
of not more than five million yen. However, no representatives have been prosecuted 
based on this provision. These provisions were not reviewed in the 2005 amendment. 
It is noteworthy that despite the existence of criminal penalty provisions, very few cases 
are ever brought, and that despite the special provision of the AMA, no case has ever 
succeeded once. The 2005 amendment is expected to improve this situation by raising 
the number of criminal referrals.
  Following US complaints made in the Structural Impediments Initiative talks 
between Japan and the United States, in 1990 the JFTC adopted a rule that it will file a 
criminal referrral only in cases having significant effects on the Japanese general public 
and/or concerns about possible repetition, although there is no legal limitation on the 
JFTC’s criminal referrals.26 In 2005, after the amendment of the AMA, the JFTC revised 
this rule to address a leniency program introduced by the 2005 amendment. The reviewed 
rule provides that the JFTC will not file a criminal referral against the first applicant with 
the Prosecutor General under the leniency program for violations of the AMA. 27
Investigation Powers 
Since the original AMA was enacted, the JFTC was granted only administrative inves-
tigation powers. Administrative investigation powers are designed to match civil cases 
which require the predominance of evidence. Using its administrative powers, the JFTC 
has been able to enter the business premises of firms and any other relevant places to 
search for and inspect business documents and other items without a warrant issued by 
a judge. Exercising the administrative investigative power requires the consent of the 
targeted companies because there is no warrant. In other words, the JFTC could not 
investigate companies through physical force by using this power. Accordingly, until the 
2005 amendment of the AMA, the JFTC’s investigation powers have been limited to the 
level of matching civil cases in spite of the fact the JFTC has the authority to file criminal 13
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referrals against a company that violated the AMA. Although other agencies such as the 
National Tax Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission have 
criminal investigation powers in addition to administrative investigation powers, the 
JFTC did not have any investigative powers which matched those in criminal cases. It 
had been also said that the JFTC’s investigation powers are not strong enough to gather 
evidence to meet the standard required for criminal referral, namely the ‘beyond reason-
able doubt’ burden of proof. The 2005 amendments introduced criminal investigation 
powers into the JFTC. Now the JFTC can conduct a compulsory investigation with a 
warrant issued by a judge.
3 Surcharges (Kachokin)
Concurrent surcharges and criminal fines 
A surcharge was introduced into Japan in 1977 by amending the AMA to target hard-
core cartels. This was the first case in Japanese legal system where monetary penalties 
were introduced into administrative laws. In general, Japanese administrative law can 
impose criminal fines against violations of laws, but cannot impose administrative (or 
civil) monetary penalties. The second example of this occurred in 2004, almost 30 years 
after the introduction of this provision. The amended Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) 
introduced administrative civil monetary penalties (kachokin) system to prevent certain 
violations of the SEL more effectively.28 Accordingly, there are two kinds of kachokin, 
administrative monetary penalties, in Japanese legal system. Japan’s kachokin system has 
unique features compared to that of other countries: firstly, the rate of kachokin is fixed, 
so an administrative agency has no discretion on calculating the amount; secondly, there 
is a problem with adjusting kachokin to criminal fines in terms of function and amount. 
These  features  stem  from  having  concurrent  administrative  monetary  penalties  and 
criminal penalties.
  Why did the AMA need administrative penalties? This is because there was practi-
cally no penalty to prevent hard-core cartels under existing law enforcement provisions. 
There were only criminal penalties in the AMA before the 1977 amendment, but they 
had not worked in law enforcement. In fact, in the first criminal case, two petrochemical 
products cartel cases were prosecuted in 1974; after that no criminal case was pursued 
until 1991. This might be because the level of proof required is so high in criminal cases 
that the JFTC could not collect adequate evidence. Only cease and desist orders were, 
practically, issued against cartel participants. Even if cartel participants were ordered to 
cease any acts in violation of the AMA, they could keep the illegal gains earned during the 14
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duration of the cartel. From the point of view of economic profits, there was no deter-
rent effect in the remedies of the AMA. The AMA, therefore, needed another monetary 
penalty which was easier to impose on violators rather than criminal penalties.
  Since the AMA was originally enacted, there had been criminal penalties but no 
administrative penalties in the AMA until 1977. These criminal penalties were consid-
ered to be measure against crime, or a sanction. In order to distinguish surcharges from 
criminal fines, it was emphasised at their introduction that their purpose was not a sanc-
tion but seizure of illegal gains from cartel participants. Accordingly, it was generally 
accepted that the amount of surcharges should be confined to illegal gains and it should 
not be permissable to raise rates of the surcharges over illegal gains. When the JFTC 
intended to raise the surcharge rates, some people argued that if the surcharge rates are 
raised over illegal gains, they would be close to criminal sanctions and that this would 
amount to double jeopardy, which the Japanese Constitution prohibits. Double jeopardy 
means concurrent imposition of criminal fines and surcharges having the same features 
as criminal fines. Since the surcharges would become sanctions if their amount exceeds 
illegal gains, their purpose would be the same as criminal fines. If their purposes are the 
same, surcharges would be unconstitutional. The argument is based on the interpreta-
tion of the latter part of Article 39 of the Japanese Constitution, which reads ‘No person 
shall be placed in double jeopardy for the same criminal offence.’ However, regarding 
this problem, there is a Supreme Court case, which ruled in a tax case that although an 
additional tax is administrative sanction, it differs from criminal fines in terms of its pur-
pose and nature, such that the concurrent imposition shall not be construed as a case of 
double jeopardy banned under the Constitution. According to the court ruling, even if 
the purpose of surcharges is to impose a sanction, the concurrent imposition of criminal 
fines and surcharges is constitutional.29 
  When the 2005 amendment was discussed in the Diet, the Chief Cabinet Secretary 
said with regard to this issue, that ‘while the reviewed surcharge system has been strength-
ened in terms of its function as an administrative sanction by changing it into a framework 
for collecting money in excess of the amount of illegal gains, the legal character thereof 
to date remains unchanged after the latest review in terms of the imposition of monetary 
penalties on violating businesses by administrative agencies to prevent violations’.30
  In light of the above official statement, surcharges should be considered as admin-
istrative fines which work as seizure of illegal gains and an administrative sanction. The 
argument on the double jeopardy has been rejected by both the government and the 
court. When discussing the 2005 amendment, some Japanese businesses were, however, 
arguing that the increase in surcharges would cause problems under the Constitution.31 
At that time, their first priority might be to avoid significant increases in surcharges by 15
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provoking discussions on the concurrence of both fines. At the present time, they empha-
sised that criminal fines should be unified into surcharges whether or not applying them 
concurrently is constitutional;32 administrative fines can play the same role as criminal 
fines in punishing a company or preventing a violations. Furthermore, they maintained 
that there are no jurisdictions having both types of fines. In fact, big economies such as 
the United States and the EU do not apply concurrent criminal fines and administrative 
fines.  In the United States, hard-core cartel participants are as a matter of practice pun-
ished as a criminal offender pursuant to the Sherman Act. On the other hand, as the EU 
has no authority to impose criminal penalties, there is naturally no criminal charge in the 
EU competition laws. In light of these claims, we shall examine how fines are designed 
below.
Design of Fines 
Even if there is no problem with the Constitution, there are still some problems remain-
ing in terms of how to design administrative fines and criminal fines. Both criminal fines 
and administrative fines have a common feature in that both have the negative financial 
impact on the violator. While imprisonment and fines represent criminal penalties for an 
individual, only criminal fines can be imposed against a company.  Some people, consider-
ing the above point, have argued that criminal fines are not needed to punish a company 
because administrative fines can cause enough financial damages to punish. In practice, 
unitary fines may work more efficiently because one agency can control them. However, 
there are generally two important differences between criminal fines and administrative 
fines: The first is the difference in the level of proof. While criminal cases require proving 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’, ‘the preponderance of evidence’ which is a lower level of proof 
is required in administrative cases. The second is the difference in the impact on society. 
Criminal penalties can create a huge impact by stigmatising a violating corporation as a 
criminal offender, while administrative penalties have a more limited impact of bringing 
dishonour to the offender. In the Japanese AMA, there is also a difference in calculating 
the amounts of fines. A criminal fine is calculated up to 500 million yen under the court’s 
discretion, taking into accout aggravating or mitigating factors in terms of the culpability 
of the violator, while a surcharge is calculated based on the fixed rate prescribed by the 
AMA without any JFTC discretion.
  In light of these points, a design should consider which is more appropriate in Ja-
pan in terms of deterring violations, concurrent fines or a unitary fine. Firstly, we explore 
other countries’ systems of penalties imposed against hard-core cartel participants. The 
U.K. introduced criminal penalties for individuals engaged in cartels with a maximum 16
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jail sentence of five years in 2002 by the Enterprise Act, but for corporations there are 
no criminal sanctions. In Australia, criminal penalties have not been introduced yet, but 
the Dawson Committee, which was set up to comprehensively review the Trade Practice 
Act, recommended that criminal penalties should be introduced for serious or hard-core 
cartel behaviour, with penalties to include fines against corporations and imprisonment 
and fines for individuals, after the matter is resolved.33 The problems are that the devel-
opment of a satisfactory definition of serious cartel behaviour and a workable method of 
combining a clear and certain leniency policy with a criminal regime. Now we can classify 
those systems into four types: the US-type of only criminal penalties, the EU-type of only 
administrative penalties, the UK-type administrative penalties but criminal penalties for 
individuals, and the Japan-type concurrent criminal and administrative penalties.
  As the OECD recommendation said that hard-core cartels are the most egregious 
violation of competition law, they should be punished as a crime and should attract social 
stigma. Criminal penalties can be theoretically considered as the most effective deterrent 
for hard-core cartel participants. From this point of view, the US-type is the best way to 
deter hard-core cartels. On the other hand, criminal penalties require such a high level 
of proof that there may be some cases where criminal penalties can not be imposed, but 
administration penalties can be applied. Especially in Japan it is said that prosecutors need 
such extensive evidence that it may take much more time to collect evidence, without any 
plea bargaining, than in administrative cases. Considering the limited resources available, it 
is more convenient to impose administrative penalties. Practically, the Japan-type approach 
is considered to be a good system as long as criminal penalties work. The U.K.-type model 
has an advantage that one agency can determine the amount of fine considering all the 
factors in the violations, but there might be a contradiction that while an individual who 
carries out an action in violation of the AMA is a criminal, the corporation employing 
the individual is not a criminal. If the U.K.-type system is introduced in Japan, Japan will 
have to eliminate criminal sanctions, which it had originally adopted against corporations, 
but this may lead to a perception in society that violations of the AMA are not serious. At 
least in Japan it is, therefore, difficult to introduce the U.K.-type of measure. In conclu-
sion, Japan should maintain its concurrent fines, but Japan should also step up criminal 
enforcement. With regard to hard-core cartels, the JFTC should, in principle, deal with 
them as a crime and first conduct a criminal investigation, since this authority was granted 
to the JFTC by 2005 amendment.
  There are still some problems in designing concurrent fines: the JFTC discretion as 
to how to calculate the amount of administrative fines, and setting an adjustment between 
criminal fines and administrative fines. As mentioned, the JFTC has no discretionary power 
as to the amount of surcharge and cannot take account of the culpability of the violator 17
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in calculating the amount of a surcharge. This is because a discretionary administrative 
fine has the same character as a criminal fine in terms of addressing the various aspects 
of any violation. Although there are no constitutional problems with concurrent fines, 
the difference in calculating each monetary penalty is required for a court to perform its 
important role that a criminal should be punished according to their culpability. 
  When discussing the 2005 amendment to the AMA, some people in Japan claimed 
that if administrative fines are increased, concurrent fines need to incorporate an adjust-
ment between criminal fines and administrative fines when both fines are imposed. In 
response to this argument, the AMA provides that when a criminal fine is concurrently 
imposed along with a surcharge, an amount equivalent to half of the applied criminal 
fine is deducted from the surcharge as otherwise calculated.34 This adjustment provision 
was based on the idea that the surcharge and the criminal fine share a common feature in 
deterring violations of the AMA.35 Criminal fines and administrative fines differ, however, 
in their aims and procedures, as explained above. Given that they are independent proc-
esses, it should not be necessary to adjust both amounts. It is, furthermore, desirable that 
the adjustment provision should be eliminated because it may reduce the effectiveness of 
criminal sanctions.
Level of Surcharges 
At least before the 2005 amendments, the surcharges in the AMA had not functioned 
effectively to deter hard-core cartels. This is because the rate of surcharges was limited to 
the level of illegal gain, which it had been believed could not be easily estimated. However, 
in June 2004 before the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, the JFTC produced data 
analysing 24 hard-core cartel cases, where the average of illegal gains was 16.3 per cent 
of the turnover in question and in 90 per cent of all the cases companies were able to 
make illegal gains of more than eight per cent.36 At that time the basic rate of surcharges 
was six per cent. In view of these figures, even if the surcharges must be not more than 
illegal gains, six per cent was too low to prevent hard-core cartels from occurring, while 
the current basic rate 10 per cent was also too low compared with actual illegal gains. In 
this sense, a criminal fine, which is up to 500 million yen for a corporation, should be 
imposed on hard-core cartel participants in addition to administrative fines.18
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Table1: History of Surcharge Rates (Small business)
Year  Basic  Retailers  Wholesalers
 
1977  1.5  %  1.0 %  0.5 % 
1991  6.0% (3.0%)  2.0 % (1.0 %)    1.0 % (1.0 %) 
2005  10.0  % (4.0 %)  3.0 % (1.2 %)  2.0 % (1.0 %)
Sources: AMA of Japan  
Note: Small businesses are defined by Paragraph 4 Article 7-2 of the AMA. For example, in case of 
manufacturing business and construction business, small business is in principle defined as companies whose 
amount of capital is not more than three hundred million yen, or whose number of regular employees is not 
more than 300. 
  Furthermore, in comparison with the fines of other developed countries, Japan’s 
fines are not regarded as an effective deterrent to hard-core cartels. In the United States, 
hard-core cartel participants are punished criminally under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Under the Sherman Act, fines of up to 100 million dollars can be imposed on corpora-
tions, and on individuals fines of up to one million dollars and/or the imprisonment for 
up to 10 years can be imposed. In general, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 raises the 
maximum fines to the amount which is the greater, the amount provided by each law or 
twice ‘the gross gain or loss’. Furthermore, Federal sentencing guidelines for organisa-
tions was enacted in November 1991 to provide certainty and fairness. According to this 
guideline, the amount of a fine for a corporation is determined by multiplying the gross 
gain, which is deemed to be 20 per cent of the relevant turnover, and the multiplier 
derived from the culpability score in anti-trust cases. As a result, the amount of the fine 
is determined from 15 per cent to 80 per cent of the relevant turnover, while Japan’s 
administrative fine is in principle fixed to 10 per cent of the relevant turnover. In the EU, 
the European Commission has the power to impose administrative fines of up to 10 per 
cent of the worldwide turnover of violators of EU anti-trust law. In the U.K., administra-
tive fines are up to 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover, just as the EU fine is. Those 
fines would result in being much higher than the Japan’s because those are calculated 
based on the worldwide turnover.37 In Australia, for a corporation the administrative 
fine is whichever the highest is: 10 million Australian dollars, three times the value of 
the benefit, or 10 per cent annual turnover. For an individual, the maximum fine is 500 
thousand Australian dollars.
  In conclusion, Japan’s administrative fines are not high enough to fight hard-core 
cartels in cooperation with other countries’ authorities, but Japan can take advantage of 
criminal sanctions, including imprisonment for an individual. Now that criminal inves-
tigation powers have been granted to the JFTC, the JFTC should put a heavy emphasis 19
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on criminal investigations to prevent and deter hard-core cartels.
Compliance Program 
In Japan, some people have argued that the existence of an effective compliance program 
should be taken into account in calculating the amount of administrative fines in order 
to improve corporate compliance.38
  In the United States, when a company has an effective compliance program in place, 
the criminal fines would be reduced even if the company violates the Sherman Act. This 
reduction will encourage companies to comply with anti-trust laws. On the contrary, it 
has been argued that if a company with an effective compliance program in place com-
mits violations of the AMA, the compliance program has proved ineffective. From this 
perspective, an effective compliance program should not considered to be a mitigating 
factor in calculating the amount of fines. 
  The US Sentencing Guidelines, which were tightened in 2004 in response to major 
corporate crimes and scandals, provide that if a company has in place an effective compli-
ance and ethics program that meets the seven requirements set out in the Guidelines, the 
compliance and ethics program may be considered as a mitigating factor in determining 
the culpability score.39 The Guidelines also say ‘Such compliance and ethics program 
shall be reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that the program is generally 
effective. The failure to prevent or detect the instant offence does not necessarily mean 
that the program is not generally effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct’. 
According to these provisions, even if a violation occurs in a company implementing an 
effective compliance and ethics program, the fine may be reduced by considering the 
program as a generally effective one. In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading’s guidance 
as to the appropriate penalty says that mitigating factors for determining the level of a 
penalty includes ‘adequate steps having been taken with a view to ensuring compliance 
with competition laws’. In Australia, an effective compliance program is also taken into 
account as a factor in setting the level of monetary penalties.40 The Australian Competi-
tion and Consumer Commission emphasises the importance of a compliance culture, 
saying on its web page that ‘If something does go wrong and a contravention of the 
Trade Practices Act (TPA) is established, the existence of a substantial and successfully 
implemented compliance program and whether the company has a corporate culture 
conducive to compliance with the TPA (compliance culture) is likely to be taken into 
consideration when the quantum of penalty is determined. On the other hand, the courts 
may impose a higher penalty if there is a poor or ineffective compliance regime. A poor 
compliance culture exposes a company to negative consequences such as adverse publicity 20
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and substantial financial and human resource costs.’ However, the EU guidelines for set-
ting fines have no explicit provisions of taking into consideration an effective compliance 
program, despite providing a large number of aggravating or mitigating factors relevant 
in setting fines.
  Although compliance programs are generally important in encouraging companies 
to obey laws, as far as the AMA of Japan is concerned, it is difficult to take into account 
an effective compliance program in calculating the amount of fines given the following 
circumstances. The JFTC has no discretionary powers as to how to calculate the amount 
of administrative fines, and the level of administrative fines is not so high compared to 
other countries. In addition, if a company periodically conducts an audit under an effective 
compliance program, the company can easily detect a violation of the AMA earlier than 
other companies and take advantage of a leniency program. Most of the companies having 
an effective compliance program in place can virtually enjoy the effect of the compliance 
program.
4 Leniency Program
Introduction of a Leniency Program 
The leniency program is the most important in the 2005 AMA amendments in terms 
of strengthening investigations into cartels. The JFTC explained in June 2004 to the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) why a leniency program was necessary for 
Japan.41 It gave two main reasons to the CEFP: one is that a leniency program provides 
a financial incentive for companies to improve their compliance. If a company conducts a 
regular audit under a compliance program and finds an act in violation carried out by an 
employee, the company has no incentive to report it to the authorities, and the company 
may decide to keep it secret. Despite having a compliance program in place, it may not 
work well without a leniency program. The other is that a leniency program provides 
an effective means for detecting a cartel conducted in secret by its nature. Competition 
authorities the world over have great difficulty in detecting cartel activities conducted in 
secret by a limited number of cartel participants. Thus, in order to address this problem, 
many advanced countries adopted a leniency regime and Japan, as a big economy, needed 
to introduce it as soon as possible. 
  Besides explaining its position to policy makers in the government, the JFTC has 
also advocated introducing a leniency program to business communities. There were, 
however, two main arguments against it: the first is that it might encourage betrayal. 
Some people argued that a leniency program is contrary to the justice system, because it 21
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will result in doing a deal with a violator of the law, like a plea bargaining in the United 
States, which does not exist in Japanese criminal law. In other words, a leniency program 
permits a violator to avoid the consequences of their action by confessing and shifting the 
burden to others. However, detecting a cartel might outweigh the concerns of injustice 
because detecting a cartel leads to bigger social welfare gains and self-reporting by an 
individual is considered to be generally worthy of lenient treatment in the Japanese Penal 
Code.42 Secondly, a leniency program could not be expected to work in Japan because 
Japanese society places value on mutual trust among members of a group. Notably, 
Japanese companies respect harmonisation among themselves so highly that a leniency 
would not work. There is, however, a fact that several Japanese companies used leniency 
programs in other countries in famous international cartels such as the vitamin cartel. In 
terms of aiming to make economic profits, Japanese companies are considered to be the 
same as other countries’ companies. In light of those arguments, a leniency program was 
successfully introduced by amending the AMA in 2005.
  Let us supplement the above explanation by describing an international cartel case. 
Considering those difficulties of investigating international cartels explained below, the 
JFTC needed a leniency program to fight cartels when cooperating with other countries’ 
authorities which had already introduced a leniency program. For example, a leniency 
program was adopted in the United States in 1978, the EU in 1996, the UK in 1998, 
and Australia in 2003. Furthermore, jurisdictions such as the United States and the EU 
succeeded in cracking down on several huge international hard-core cartels by making 
use of their leniency programs. Under the circumstances, the JFTC was internationally 
considered to be weak in fighting international cartels because it was not able to partici-
pate fully in international cooperation. 
  To take one example in which the JFTC was not able to impose surcharges on 
Japanese cartel participants, a famous international cartel was sanctioned by the relevant 
competition authorities around 2000. This cartel, one of the largest cartels ever detected, 
related to a variety of vitamins including vitamin A, B2, B3, B5, C, E, beta carotene. 
Indeed, Hoffman-La Roche (based in Switzerland) which was recognised as the instigator 
in this cartel, was given the highest ever fine 500 million dollars in the United States and 
462 million euro, the highest fine at that time in the EU. With regard to these vitamins, 
Japanese and other countries’ vitamin manufactures and distributors were suspected of 
fixing each company’s worldwide market shares of vitamins used as a basic ingredient in 
various medical and pharmaceutical products, and also of fixing each company’s prospec-
tive annual sales in the world market and in several regional markets. It was a typical cartel 
to divide markets and to restrict output. According to Corner43, the US courts imposed 
fines totalling $915 million on thirteen companies in the United States, Switzerland, 22
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Germany, Japan and Canada in 1999; the EU imposed fines totalling 855 million euros 
on eight companies in Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands, France and Japan in 2001; 
the Canadian court imposed 85.5 million Canadian dollars fines on five companies in 
1999; the Australian court imposed 26 million Australian dollars fines on three companies 
in 2001; the Korean government levied surcharges totalling 3.1 million dollars on six 
companies in Switzerland, Germany, France, Japan and Netherlands; but the Japanese 
government merely issued warnings, which are nothing but an administrative guidance, 
saying that the companies concerned should not repeat suspicious activities, to Japanese 
companies.44  The other countries’ authorities having a leniency program were able to 
receive information from the companies involved. On the other hand, at that time Japan 
did not have a leniency program and was unable to receive such information from the 
companies. If there had been a leniency program in place in Japan, the JFTC might have 
obtained information from the company and might have been able to take legal action 
and impose surcharges.
Design of the current leniency program 
It has been frequently pointed out that transparency is essential in designing a leniency 
program in order to maximise the incentive for defection and cooperation from com-
panies and their employees. Anti-trust authorities must provide enough transparency so 
that a prospective cooperating company can predict with a high degree of certainty their 
treatment at the hands of the anti-trust authorities following self- reporting. The United 
States was the first to introduce a leniency program, but its first program in 1978 did not 
work well because of a lack of transparency.45 The US program was reviewed in 1993 to 
eliminate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as much as possible. The new program 
was successful in detecting cartels owing to its transparency. In the light of the experience 
of the United States and other countries, and in order to address the criticism from busi-
ness community mentioned above, the Japanese leniency program was designed carefully 
so that it would be as transparent as possible to applicants to secure its workability.
  The Japanese leniency program has the following program features:
Firstly, full immunity from surcharges is available to only one informant, who 
is the first to apply for leniency before the JFTC’s investigation is initiated. The 
second informant and the third informant are respectively entitled to 50 per cent 
reduction and 30 per cent reduction in surcharges. Even after the investigation is 
initiated, an informant is entitled to 30 per cent reduction as long as it is within the 
third category. The Japanese leniency program is applicable to only the first three 
informants. Under this program, it is important how the order among inform-
•23
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ants should be decided. To decide the order among informants transparently, an 
informant is required to send information to one particular facsimile machine set 
up in the JFTC, the number of which is open to public. The Japanese program 
selected this method to avoid confusion about the order among informants as 
much as possible, while it represents a powerful incentive for informants to provide 
information as soon as possible.
Secondly, Japan introduced a marker system, which had been already functioning 
effectively in the United States to heighten the incentive to provide information 
as early as possible.46 It provides a tentative order, an indicative marker, for an 
applicant who could not submit a detailed report at once and is acknowledged to 
be submitting it later. The tentative order would be confirmed once the applicant 
submits a detailed report by a deadline.
Thirdly, as an exception, it is admissable for an applicant to provide an oral report 
only, although an applicant must in principle transmit a written report by facsimile. 
This is because there are concerns that discovery of information would be sought 
in international cartel cases if any action for damages were to go to the US courts, 
and it might reduce the incentive for applying for leniency to require a written 
report always.
Fourthly, the JFTC had a problem with the relationship between a leniency program 
and a penalty levied by central or local governments when a company commits bid 
rigging. This penalty is a suspension from bid participation for a certain period of 
up to 36 months. The suspension has a great effect of causing economic damage 
on a violator. 
  Under the AMA before it was amended in 2005, a suspension of business was 
imposed when the JFTC issued an order after a hearing was finished. Under the former 
system, it was said that the reason why many violators did not accept the recommendation 
of the JFTC and opted to have a hearing panel was to avoid or to postpone the suspension 
being imposed by the government. Under the current system, the suspension is imposed 
when an order is issued before the hearing begins. It is said that hearings are decreasing 
in number owing to the new system.47 If the suspension remained the same, a leniency 
program was likely not to work effectively in a bid-rigging case. The Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transportation had drawn up guidelines on the treatment of violators 
of bid rules with other central government agencies. To enhance the effectiveness of the 
leniency program, it was decided to amend these guidelines to reduce the suspension 
period for a leniency applicant to half of the regular period. Furthermore, there is another 
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any means of knowing which company has applied for leniency. In order to address this 
problem, the JFTC decided to release the names of companies given lenient treatment 
on the webpage when the company consents to the release.
  Finally, the most important issue is the relationship between a leniency program 
and a criminal prosecution. If an applicant for leniency is not allowed to be immune from 
criminal charges, the leniency program might result in failure to detect cartel activities. 
Under the AMA, the JFTC has exclusive authority to file with the Prosecutor General a 
criminal referral against a company and its employees believed to have violated the AMA. 
To address this problem, the JFTC has announced that its policy on criminal referrals is 
that it would not file criminal referrals against the first applicant for leniency, including 
against employees of the company.
Functioning 
Under the above framework, how has the Japanese leniency worked in the business com-
munity? Contrary to the initial negative forecast, the leniency program has produced 
significant results since its introduction. The JFTC has already received 105 leniency 
applications from January 2006 to March 2007.48 We can also see on the web page of 
the JFTC the names of companies which were granted lenient treatment if the companies 
consented to publication of their names. As of December 2007, a total of 33 companies 
in 13 cases had applied and been granted lenient treatment. Most of the companies that 
were accepted into the leniency program are deemed to have consented to place their 
names on the web page in order to reduce the suspension period levied by a government.   
Two important cases are described among 13 cases in which the JFTC took legal measures 
taking advantage of the leniency program.
  One is the first case in which the newly introduced leniency program was applied 
since the 2005 amendment took effect. It was a bid-rigging case in Tokyo that occurred 
over tunnel ventilation construction works procured by the Metropolitan Expressway 
Public Corporation. The MEPC had sought application for bid participation by public 
notice containing the requirements, where applicants who fulfilled those requirements 
had been automatically admitted as participants for the competitive bidding. In order to 
prevent a decrease in the bid price, seven companies had reached an agreement to pre-ar-
range the winner for each bid by holding sales staff meetings in April and June 2004. On 
8 September 2006, the JFTC revealed that three companies were granted immunity or 
reduction of the surcharge under the new leniency program. Mitubishi Heavy Industries 
Ltd. was granted immunity, and Ishikawajima-Harima Industries Co., Ltd. and Kawasaki 
Heavy Industries Ltd. were granted 30 per cent reductions. It should be noted that these 25
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companies used the leniency program repeatedly. In fact, the following nine companies 
(from 20 companies in all) applied twice or more times:
Mitubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd  4 times
Ishikawajima-Harima Industries Co., Ltd  twice 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd  twice  
JFE Engineering Corp  3 times 
Hitachi Shipbuilding Corporation  twice 
Sumitomo Metal Industries Co., Ltd  3 times
Fuji Kako Co., Ltd    twice
Sekisui Chemical Co., Ltd  twice 
Nippon Steel Engineering Co., Ltd  twice  
 
  The other case is the first criminal case where the JFTC did not refer the first leni-
ency applicant to the Prosecutor General so that the first applicant would be exempt from 
criminal penalties. This is a bid-rigging case concerning subway construction contract 
with the City of Nagoya, where the JFTC brought charges against several large, famous 
general construction companies, some of which were reported by newspapers to have 
stopped bid rigging at the end of 2005, just before January 2006 when the new AMA 
took effect. In around mid-December 2005, five companies which played an important 
part in these AMA violations—including Obayashi Corporation, Kajima Corporation, 
Shimizu Corporation, Okumura Corporation, and Maeda Corporation—agreed with 
other construction companies to pre-arrange a bid winner from among special joint 
ventures for each competitive tender on construction for extending the subway line in 
Nagoya and also agreed to make a bidding price convenient for a pre-arranged winner to 
win the contract. Based on the criminal investigation of the case, the JFTC established 
a criminal violation of the AMA and filed criminal referrals with the Prosecutor General 
against five companies and five individuals in February and March 2007. This case was 
frequently reported in the media because some of the biggest construction companies 
were involved even though they were supposed to have stopped bid rigging. Moreover, 
the first applicant for the leniency program was also a well-known general construction 
company. This case might be considered to have had a dramatic impact on the business 
community.
The results show that the Japanese leniency program was effective and has had a great 
impact on Japanese companies so far. The current leniency program might be, at the 
moment, considered to offer a strong incentive for a company to provide information 
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the business community’s expectations?  First of all, its design maximises transparency 
so that companies easily made use of the program. Secondly, especially in bid-rigging 
cases, the total penalties—including the suspension term—were enormously increased. 
Thirdly, most of the companies might have calculated that the probability of detection 
was considerably increased by the introduction of a leniency program and the height-
ened activities of the JFTC, which filed criminal referrals with the Prosecutor’s Office 
against steel bridge companies for bid rigging just before the new AMA came into effect. 
Finally, in addition to the AMA, corporate compliance requirements were significantly 
strengthened under the Japan Companies Act. If top managers knew about a violation 
of the AMA in the past, they might have kept it secret because there was no incentive to 
go public. However, since the Companies Act has specifically required executive direc-
tors to control their companies’ operations properly according to the laws, they can be 
individually charged with neglecting their duties by bringing a derivative action to court 
if they kept the violation secret. This might lead companies to accept their names’ release 
on the JFTC webpage in order to prove the propriety of the company’s operations. We 
will discuss this issue later along with corporate compliance.　
5 The JFTC and its Enforcement Role
High Prestige of the JFTC 
The Japan Fair Trade Commission, which consists of a chairman and four commissioners, 
was created under the AMA to implement competition laws as an independent admin-
istrative organisation. In other administrative fields, such as communications and public 
utilities, this type of organisation was created under the strong influence of the United 
States during the Allied occupation. Its aim was to curb political influence and exert its 
power neutrally. However, organisations other than the JFTC were abolished because 
while ministries traditionally had a long history as governmental organisations, the neu-
trality of other organisations was not considered to be so essential. The AMA prescribes 
that the chairman and commissioners are independent in the performance of their duties. 
The JFTC is administratively attached to the Cabinet Office, but performs its duties of 
administering the AMA independently without being directed by the Cabinet Office.49 
  The JFTC has not only powers to enforce the AMA, but also powers to propose 
amendments to the AMA and other competition laws. Under the Constitution of Japan, 
the Cabinet has power to submit bills to the Diet, and based on this power, each ministry 
prepares bills and submits them to the Diet through the Cabinet. The JFTC drafted the 
2005 amendments to the AMA and submitted them to the Diet through the Cabinet 27
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under the direction of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, who is a member of the Cabinet. No 
less important is the fact that all the bills drafted by each ministry of the government need 
to be approved by the ruling Coalition. It goes without saying that the amendments to 
the AMA had to be approved by the ruling parties. In this regard, there is a powerful 
‘study group’ in the Liberal Democratic Party called the AMA Policy Council, which 
examines the JFTC’s proposals and conducts hearings with business associations such as 
the Japan Business Federation. 
  To summarise, the JFTC has strong and unique powers provided by the AMA, 
which was originally enacted in 1947 under the influence of the United States. Firstly, 
the JFTC is an independent organisation when it performs its duties of enforcement, 
but it is directed by the Cabinet when it drafts bills. Secondly, although the JFTC is the 
agency for enforcing the AMA, it is allowed to take the place of a court of first instance 
and it is also granted the rule of substantive evidence, which is not granted to a court of 
first instance. Thirdly, the JFTC has a monopoly in anti-trust enforcement. Namely, the 
JFTC has the exclusive power to charge violators through the Prosecutor’s Office, and it 
involves private damage actions prescribed by the AMA. Considering these provisions of 
the AMA, the AMA gave the JFTC high prestige and concentrates enforcement powers 
on the JFTC. Accordingly, achieving fair and free competition sought by the AMA greatly 
depends on the JFTC’s enforcement.
Brief History of Enforcement 
After the end of the occupation in 1952, the AMA was under pressure to relax its controls 
from the business community and other ministries such as the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) that regulated industries. In fact, in the first half of the 
1950’s, the Japanese government reviewed the AMA to relax its regulations and enacted 
other laws in order to allow specific cartels by way of authorising certain types of cartel 
activities, notably depression cartels.50 While many depression cartels were authorised 
and implemented until the 1980’s, the JFTC had a hard time implementing anti-cartel 
enforcement because stringent enforcement could have led to accusations of unfairness 
due to the existence of depression cartels. Although those provisions for authorising car-
tels were finally repealed in the 1990s, the JFTC’s cartel enforcement was relatively weak 
during this long period from the 1950’s to the 1980’s because so many exemptions were 
authorised on specific cartels. However, during this period, in 1974, the JFTC successfully 
detected oil cartels and file criminal referrals against oil companies with the Prosecutor 
General virtually for the first time. When the global oil crisis occurred and consumer prices 
increased dramatically during the 1970’s, Japanese consumers began to pay scrupulous 28
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attention to corporate behaviour. Most companies raised prices more than cost increases, 
taking advantage of the tight supply-demand situation. In these circumstances, the JFTC 
proactively investigated oil companies in response to consumers’ antipathy toward the oil 
companies. After the incident, the AMA was reviewed to strengthen its deterrent effect 
and surcharges were incorporated into its counter-measures. 
  In the 1980’s, Japan began to post huge trade surpluses, following its quick re-
covery from the economic stagnation of the international community caused by the oil 
crisis. Under such external economic conditions, combined with the economic recession 
in other industrialised countries, criticism from other advanced countries, especially the 
United States grew over the impediments to access to the Japanese markets. In order to 
address this problem, the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks with the Govern-
ment of the United States began in 1989 and continued until 1992. The SII aimed at 
eliminating trade barriers in Japan and the United States. As a result, it created a pro-
competition policy atmosphere in Japan. In the SII talks, it was pointed out that there 
were two major issues, relating to competition policy, in Japanese business. The first 
issue was that a culture of harmonisation existed in Japanese business community which 
tended to induce cartels or bid rigging, which created difficulties for foreign companies 
entering the Japanese market. To solve this issue, various penalties under the AMA were 
strengthened. One step was to raise surcharges so that cartels would be deterred. The basic 
rate was increased from 1.5 per cent to six per cent in 1991. Another relates to criminal 
sanctions. The upper limit of criminal fines for a corporation was raised from five million 
yen to one hundred million yen in 1991, and the JFTC announced its policy of filing 
criminal referrals against violations of the AMA with the Prosecutor General in 1990. In 
response to these reviews, the JFTC in 1991 restarted criminal enforcement for the first 
time in 17 years and filed criminal referrals against eight companies for fixing prices of 
plastic film used for wrapping food. The second issue was over ‘keiretsu’, which means 
vertical trade restraints. In response to this, the JFTC released new guidelines in 1991. 
After the SSI, competition policy became a major priority in Japan. A comprehensive bill 
aimed at abolishing exemptions from the AMA was drawn up twice by the government, 
in 1997 and in 1999, and approved by the Diet. As a result, many exemptions, including 
depression cartels, were abolished.
  It has been argued that Japan’s enforcement was weak because of the nature of the 
JFTC. Some people argued to the contrary, that the JFTC actively enforced the AMA and 
commended the series of reforms of the JFTC launched in the 1990’s, although no one 
disputed that the JFTC’s anti-cartel enforcement was weak before the 1990’s. According the 
former Commissioner Itoda (2000), the JFTC vigorously enforced the AMA emphasising 
that the JFTC amended the law itself to improve its effectiveness.51 Most researchers in 29
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the United States and Japan have, however, asserted that Japan’s enforcement regime was 
still weak after the 1990’s reforms. Considering the current enforcement regime, JFTC’s 
enforcement might be assessed as weak at least until the 2005 AMA amendments.52 There 
are several reasons for the relatively weak performance of anti-trust enforcement in the 
past. First is Japan’s often negative view of the utility of anti-trust as economic policy, 
compared with the dominance of industrial policy conducted by the MITI. Second is the 
position of the JFTC in relation to other government ministries. These two reasons have 
been often pointed out.53 According to First and Shiraishi (2005), no less important than 
these reasons is the concentration of enforcement authority in the JFTC or the JFTC’s 
monopolisation of enforcement.54 However, in the past this concentration might have 
resulted in weak enforcement, but in the future it might lead to tougher enforcement. 
The future depends on the JFTC’s attitude and efforts. 
Organisation 
The Japanese Government has strictly controlled the size of the government organisations 
in accordance with the law. While the other ministries and agencies have been decreasing 
in size, the number of the JFTC’s employees has been significantly increasing, especially 
after 2002. The increase in its employees was only seven in 1998, six in 1999, eight in 
2000, seven in 2001, and then 36 in 2002. After 2002, the increase in each year was 
between 29 to 36.  In 2001, as the Koizumi Government began to plan its 2002 budget, 
it put emphasis on competition policy, and the number of JFTC’s employees increased 
significantly compared with other government organisations. Furthermore, we can easily 
understand the connection in the long run between the number of its employees and 
the priority on competition policy within the Japanese Government by looking at Table 
2, which shows the number of its employees from the start of the JFTC to 2008. The 
number in 1960 was less than the number in 1947 when the JFTC established. During 
the 1950’s and 1960’s, the JFTC faced difficulties with anti-trust enforcement owing to 
many exemptions under the AMA. Obviously, competition policy was given a low prior-
ity by the then government. After the SSI talks, the importance of competition policy 
was recognised by the government. Especially, after the Koizumi Government started, 
the top priority was finally placed on competition policy, as his inauguration speech in 
the Diet stated. 30
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Table 2 History of the Number of JFTC’s Employees
Fiscal Year  1947  1950   1960   1970   1980   1990   1995   2000   2005  2008 
Employees  284   316  238   351   422   474   520   564   706   795  
Increase    32   -78   113   71   52   46   44   142   89
Source: JFTC annual reports
  In addition to the number of the employees, the JFTC’s organisation was sig-
nificantly reformed in 1996. The grade of the JFTC’s office was raised from the simple 
‘Secretariat’ with no bureaus, to the ‘General Secretariat’ with two bureaus, whose grade 
equals to those of other ministries. At a time when the size and number of government 
organisations was being strictly controlled, this reform was an extremely rare case. Now 
that, in terms of size or grade, the JFTC can compare to other ministries, it should make 
the most of its organisation to achieve the AMA’s goal of fair and free competition.
Recent Activities 
Regarding administrative enforcement, we can see how the JFTC enforced the AMA over 
the past five years. Table 3 shows the number of legal measures, which means cease and 
desist orders and surcharge payment orders (without cease and desist orders), issued by 
the JFTC from 2002 to 2006. There are two features of JFTC activities: the first is that 
bid-rigging cases represent the most frequent violations of the law. The total number of 
JFTC legal measures over five years was 129. Altogether 85 cases out of 129, or 66 per 
cent, were bid- rigging violations. In addition to this ratio, the number of companies 
involved in bid rigging is generally large compared with the number involved in price 
fixing. The JFTC has, thus, allocated major resources to bid-rigging cases. The second 
feature is that the number of legal measures widely fluctuated between 37 and 13, but 
decreased to13 in 2006 when the new AMA came into effect. Moreover, the number of 
bid-rigging cases sharply decreased from 13 to six in 2006. This is supposedly because 
the JFTC dealt with big cases including two criminal cases.
Table 3: The Number of Legal Measures taken by the JFTC
Fiscal Year  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  Total
Bid Rigging  30  14  22  13  6  85(65.9 %) 
Price Cartel  2  3  2  4  3  14 (10.9 %)  
Private Monopolisation  0  1  2  0  0  3( 2.3 %) 
Unfair Trade Practice  3  7  8  2  4  24 (18.6 %)  
       Others  2  0  1  0  0  3( 2.3 %) 
  Total  37  25  35  19  13  129 (100 %)
Source: JFTC annual reports31
No. 373, 2008
  Regarding criminal enforcement, the JFTC has been more active since a bid-rig-
ging case over steel bridge construction was brought in May 2005. For the years from 
May 2005 to April 2008, for three years the JFTC filed referrals in four cases, but for 14 
years from 1991 to 2005 it only filed referrals against 7 cases at a rate of one case every 
two years. Recent cases are all bid rigging, as Table 4 shows. 
Table 4: Recent Criminal Cases from 2002 to 2007
Referral  Prosecution  Case
24 May 2007  13 June 2007  Bid rigging over main forest road projects procured by Japan 
    Resources Agency 
28 Feb. 2007  20 March. 2007  Bid rigging over subway construction procured by Nagoya    
    City 
23 May 2006  12 June 2006  Bid rigging over human waste disposal facilities construction 
    procured by local municipalities　 
23 May 2005  15 June 2005   Bid rigging over steel bridge construction procured by the 
    Japan Highway Public Corporation and the Ministry of Land,  
    Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) 
2 July 2003  23 July 2003  Bid rigging over water meters procured by Tokyo Metropolis
Source: Press releases of the JFTC
  We now describe two most important cases in the above five cases. The first case 
is a bid rigging concerning steel bridge construction works procured in the financial 
year 2004 by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) and the Japan 
Highway Public Corporation (JHPC). Firstly, the JFTC detected bid rigging in the MLIT 
procurement and filed criminal referrals against 26 companies and eight individuals with 
the Prosecutor General in May and June 2005. After this detection, more extensive bid 
rigging was detected in the JHPC projects. While in the first detected case the JFTC did 
not recognise any involvement of officials, in the JHPC case the JFTC discovered that 50 
construction companies, including important members of Nippon Keidanren, decided 
on the bid winners in advance, jointly and through involvement of officials of the JHPC. 
Naturally, the purpose of these companies was to secure stable profits from public pro-
curement by preventing declining bridge construction prices. In this case, facilitation by 
an executive official of the JHPC enabled the companies concerned to rig a series of bids 
by jointly approving a ‘bid winner allocation chart’, which was made and submitted by 
an employee of one of the companies who was once an executive official of the JHPC. 
The reason why those current and former executive officials were involved in bid rigging 
is that they wanted to secure jobs for retirees of the JHPC in construction companies, 
through distributing profits of procurement for those companies which employed the 
retirees, by means of organising such bid rigging. 32
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  Since the JFTC found a criminal violation of the Antimonopoly Act, it filed crimi-
nal referrals in June and August 2005 with the Prosecutor General against six companies 
and seven individuals that had played a critical role in the violation. Included were two 
executives of the JHPC who allegedly committed the crime. Besides these criminal refer-
rals, because officials of the JHPC were found to have tacitly permitted the bid rigging 
and facilitated selection of bid winners among bid participants, the JFTC, based on the 
Government-led Bid Rigging Prevention Act, ordered the President of the JFTC, to 
implement corrective measures to eliminate and prevent involvement of its officials in bid 
rigging. This case is distinguished from other criminal cases in that it made an enormous 
impact on the Japanese public, including the business community just before January 
2006 when the new AMA took effect. Most Japanese people, for the first time, noticed 
that violations of the AMA involved a serious crime owing to sensational reports in the 
media, which paid full attention to this case because two executive officials of the JHPC 
(scheduled to be privatised in October 2005) were prosecuted. Moreover, well-known 
big companies were also involved. Nippon Keidanren ordered the 15 representatives of 
member companies that were prosecuted in this case to suspend their activities as a mem-
ber for three months and to establish corporate compliance and ethics. In this case, the 
total surcharges, levied on 44 companies ranging from 854 million yen to four million 
yen, amounted to approximately 13 billion yen, largest surcharge for a bid-rigging case 
at that time in Japanese history. The six companies prosecuted were: Yokogawa Bridge 
Corp., Mitubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd., 
Kawada Industries, Inc., JFE Engineering Corporation, and Miyaji Iron Works Co. Ltd.   
It should be noted that three companies applied for a leniency program later.
  The second is a bid-rigging case over human waste disposal facilities construction 
works, in which the JFTC, for the first time, conducted a criminal investigation. Eleven 
companies had agreed to pre-arrange bid winners among bid participants for construction 
works of human waste disposal facilities ordered by local municipalities and to cooperate 
with each other for pre-arranged winners to be able to win bids at their seeking prices. 
The JFTC took advantage of its new investigation powers shortly after the new AMA 
came into effect and successfully filed criminal refferrals against 11 companies and their 
employees with the Prosecutor General in May and June 2006. Accordingly, the new 
criminal investigation powers might be considered be highly effective in gathering relevant 
evidence.33
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6 Japanese Bid Rigging (Dango)
A bid rigging (dango), in which companies get together beforehand and agree the winner 
of supposedly competitive bidding, is the best known corporate crime in Japan. It has 
been said that it is commonly practised in almost all public work procurement through-
out Japan, although it is difficult to prove objectively that dango is a common practice in 
Japan. A great deal of bid rigging is indeed cracked down on by the JFTC, police officers 
or prosecutors. After a steel bridge bid-rigging case was detected, Chairman of Nippon 
Keidanren, Okuda reportedly said that since dango was a kind of work sharing practised 
everywhere in Japan, it would be difficult to stop it in the near future.55 A report released 
by the Japan Civil Engineering Constructors Association said that they had determined to 
cut their connection with old practices, including dango, in order to set up a new business 
model.56 It was reported that more than 80 per cent of the Japanese people believed that 
there were illegal conducts including dango in public works procurement.57 
Penal Code 
There are, besides the AMA, the two important laws regulating bid rigging on public 
bids in Japan: one is the Penal Code; the other is the Government-led Bid Rigging Pre-
vention Act.  
  The Japanese Penal Code includes provisions imposing sanctions against bid rigging 
which was enacted in 1941 during the Second World War.58 Thus, bid rigging has been 
a crime in Japan for a long time. In spite of this fact, bid rigging was allegedly practised 
very widely in Japan. Why didn’t the Japanese Penal Code work? According to Takeda 
(1994), this is because some court decisions admitted that bid rigging were divided 
into two groups: good bid rigging and bad bid rigging.59 Although bad bid rigging is 
a crime, good bad rigging is not illegal. In accordance with these court decisions, the 
Public Prosecutor Office was not eager to prosecute bid rigging for a long time.60 Article 
96-3 of the Penal Code was interpreted by the courts to mean that illegal bid rigging 
should be limited in terms of its purpose.61  It reads ‘for the purpose of preventing a fair 
determination of price or acquiring wrongful gains’. The issue is how these two terms, 
‘wrongful gains’ and ‘a fair determination of price’ should be interpreted. ‘Wrongful gains’ 
means some money for which a bid winner pays other companies, thereby committing 
bid rigging. It is said about adjustment among bid-rigging participants that a winner 
does not pay money to other companies, but a possible winner will be sifted in turn 
among participants under the recent Japanese bid rigging. Accordingly, there have been 
no arguments over this interpretation, but legal arguments were put forward over ‘a fair 
determination of price’. ‘A fair determination of price’ was interpreted by the courts not 34
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to mean that a price should be determined in competitive bid process, but to mean that 
a price should be within the cost and the proper profit of the bid winner. This means that 
even if a bid is rigged, the bid rigging is not a crime as long as the bid price is proper. Of 
course, at the moment, it is generally considered that this interpretation is wrong, but it 
was claimed that these court decisions prevailed so that the Japanese dango system was 
firmly established in the construction industry during 1960’s and 1970’s.62 
  As explained above, the AMA has criminal sanction provisions against hard-core 
cartels including bid rigging. There are, accordingly, two laws providing criminal sanctions 
against bid rigging, but there are several differences between the AMA and the Criminal 
Code. Firstly, the AMA provides a maximum fine of 500 million yen against a company 
and a maximum fine of five million yen or up to three-year imprisonment against an 
individual, while the Penal Code provides a maximum fine of two and a half million yen 
or up to two-year imprisonment against an individual. The AMA provides more severe 
sanctions than the Penal Code and also provides criminal sanctions against a company, 
which cannot be punished under the Penal Code. Secondly, regarding violations of the 
AMA, the JFTC has exclusive power to file criminal referrals with the Prosecutor General. 
In other words, without the JFTC’s criminal referral against a company committing bid 
rigging, the company can not be prosecuted. Thirdly, under the AMA a bid rigging is 
violation of regulations on ‘unreasonable restraint of trade’ ‘in any particular field’, which 
is generally interpreted to requires repetition or possible repetition of a violation. On 
the contrary, the Penal Code does not require repetition so that a single violation will 
constitute a criminal offence. Under the Penal Code, authorities might easily establish a 
crime of a bid rigging, but they can not punish a company.
  During 2005 and 2006, the Prosecutor’s Office continuously prosecuted several 
big criminal cases constituting bid rigging not under the AMA but under the Penal 
Code: There are, firstly, three local government cases where the governors of Fukushima, 
Wakayama, and Miyazaki Prefectures were arrested from October to December 2006 for 
interfering in bidding or violation of Paragraph 1, Article 96-3, Penal Code, or for taking 
bribes from a company which committed bid rigging. It was reported that the governors 
interfered in a bidding process to facilitate bid rigging for local construction companies’ 
benefit, because they badly needed cooperation in elections from them. Secondly, there 
are two central governmental organisation cases; the former Tokyo International Airport 
authority (TIAA), and the Defence Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) case. In 
the TIAA case, the former two TIAA’s managers were arrested in December 2005 for 
leading a bid rigging over electricity facilities procurement carried out by three compa-
nies. In the DFAA case, the Deputy Director-General (the number three position in the 
DFAA) and two other officials were arrested in January 2006 for leading a bid rigging 35
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over air conditioning facilities procurement. Those arrests led to the detection of other 
bid-rigging cases concerning civil engineering and construction projects procured by the 
DFAA, in which 60 companies were involved throughout Japan. It became such a big 
political problem that it caused the abolition of the DFAA. In both cases, those officials 
aimed at securing a place in the companies for the employees who were supposed to leave 
their organisations, and as a result, one of the five officials was sentenced to one and half 
in prison and the others were given suspended sentences of one year to one-and-a-half 
year imprisonment. On the other hand, the companies’ sales staffs were only fined 500 
thousand yen and the companies themselves were not fined at all owing to the Penal 
Code having no penalties against companies.
Government-led Bid Rigging Prevention Act and Other Penalties 
The AMA had been not been applied in the case of bid rigging over public works until the 
JFTC investigated construction companies in Shizuoka Prefecture and issued a surcharge 
payment order against them in March 1982. After the SSI talks, the JFTC’s enforcement 
was strengthened and it cracked down in several bid-rigging cases, but they were not 
dealt with as criminal cases. In 1994, bid rigging involving sewage electricity facilities 
procured by the Japan Sewage Works Agency (JSWA) was investigated and developed 
into a criminal case, where the JFTC found out that an official of the JSWA led the bid 
rigging and the JFTC filed a criminal referral with the Prosecutor General based on the 
findings. After this case, there were many cases where the government officials led bid rig-
ging or were at least involved in bid rigging. They facilitated bid rigging by providing bid 
participants with information such as a planned ceiling price or by indicating in advance 
a specific company as a contracting party, which was called ‘champion’ in the Japanese 
dango community. Among these cases, bid rigging concerning agricultural civil engineer-
ing construction procured by Kamikawa Office, Hokkaido Prefecture drew attention and 
criticism from the Japanese public in 2000 because local government officials initiated the 
bid rigging. Since the JFTC had requested Hokkaido Prefecture unofficially to correct 
the illegal involvement of the officials in any bid rigging, Diet members began to discuss 
the enactment of a special law to prevent officials’ involvement in bid rigging because of 
the limitation of the AMA that the JFTC was not able to issue a legal request or order 
against a government agency. After a long argument, in July 2002 the Act Concerning 
Elimination and Prevention of Involvement in Bid Rigging (the Government-led Bid 
Rigging Prevention Act) was enacted and put into effect in January 2003.
  According to the Government-led Bid Rigging Prevention Act, when the JFTC 
recognises the specific behaviour of officials involved in bid rigging which facilitated bid 36
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rigging committed by private companies, the JFTC may demand the head of the procure-
ment agency should take corrective measures. Once the procurement agency receives the 
demand from the JFTC, they shall perform necessary inspections and implement corrective 
measures necessary to eliminate and prevent bid rigging led by their officials.
  Since the Act took effect, the JFTC has recognised involvement of officials in four 
bid- rigging cases on construction works and demanded the four agencies for which 
those officials worked should carry out corrective measures to eliminate and prevent 
their officials’ involvement. The first case is a bid rigging in Iwamizawa City, Hokkaido 
Prefecture in January 2003. The second is a bid rigging in Nigata City in July 2004. 
The third is bid rigging in the Japan Highway Public Cooperation in September 2005, 
as already explained. The last case is bid rigging in the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure 
and Transport in March 2007. 
  Among the cases mentioned above, the JFTC found bid rigging over floodgate 
construction projects procured by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, 
and other agencies. The investigation by the JFTC revealed that officials of the MLIT 
facilitated such bid rigging. To be more specific, over 20 companies jointly decided on 
bid winners in advance, through involvement of officials of each procurement agency, to 
prevent prices of floodgate construction projects from declining. Therefore, on 8 March 
2007 in accordance with Article 3 of the Government-led Bid Rigging Prevention Act, 
the JFTC demanded that the MLIT should carry out corrective measures on the ad-
ministration of bidding and contracts so as to prevent involvement of its officials in bid 
rigging. This was the first case where a central government agency had been subjected to 
the Government-led Bid Rigging Prevention Act. Besides the demand against the MLIT 
for corrective measures, the JFTC issued cease and desist orders and surcharge payment 
orders. The total amount of the surcharge was 1.67 billion yen.
  In spite of the enactment of the Act, bid rigging with involvement of officials, in-
cluding the DFAA case, continued to be detected throughout Japan and to draw strong 
criticism from the nation. To address this problem, then Prime Minister Koizumi gave 
two directives in December 2005 to the Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic 
Party and the Chief Cabinet Secretary: the first directive was to amend the Government-
led Bid Rigging Prevention Act to prevent government officials’ involvement with bid 
rigging, given criticism from the business community that a government official should 
be sanctioned more severely. The second directive was to improve tendering and con-
tracting system in the public works so that a bid rigging would not occur under the new 
system. 
  In response to the first direction, the Coalition Parties immediately set up the 
study group consisting of the Diet members to discuss reviewing the Act. In December 37
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2006, the Act was amended and strengthened in respect to the following two items: the 
introduction of the criminal penalty, the maximum of five years imprisonment or the 
maximum of two-and-a- half million yen fine, imposed on officials involved in bid rigging, 
and expansion of the specific definition of the behaviour of officials. The amendment to 
the Act came into effect on 14 March 2007.
  Based on the second direction, the government launched the Liaison Conference 
of Relevant Ministries and Agencies for Promoting Proper Public Procurement. In Feb-
ruary 2006, a policy statement titled ‘Action to Secure Justness in Public Procurement’ 
was released. It aims at strengthening administrative penalties such as suspension of the 
right to participate in bidding; where bid rigging is on a large scale and systematic, the 
government could extend suspension of bid participation term up to 24 months. The 
statement also reviewed procurement rules with a view to preventing bid rigging; the 
government should change its bidding system to open and competitive bidding from 
designated competitive bidding.
  Regarding a bid rigging, we have several penalties imposed by a government as 
a procurer or a regulator: First is suspension from participating in bidding. In light of 
the bid rigging in the MLIT, the suspension term was furthermore extended from the 
24 months mentioned in the policy statement to 36 months in March 2007. Second is 
damage payment. Considering the recent bid-rigging cases mentioned above, almost 
all governments have introduced a special provision into public works contracts, which 
prescribes that if a company rigs any bidding, the company shall pay a damage up to 15 
per cent of the amount contracted in case of the central government. The rate of damage 
to the amount contracted depends on the government, but 97 per cent of Prefectures 
and Ordinance-designated Cities (the 13 largest cities in Japan) adopted 10 per cent or 
more than 10 per cent rates according the JFTC’s survey released on 31 October 2006. 




In Japan the circumstances surrounding corporate compliance have changed signifi-
cantly. First are the amendments to laws pertaining corporate compliance such as the 
Companies Act and the Securities and Exchange Law, whose name was changed to the 
Financial Instruments and Exchange Law in 2007. The other is the fact that a great deal 
of corporate misconduct in violation of laws is occurring. Recent examples regarding 38
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violations of other laws than the AMA, include Mitubishi Motors’ systematic, long-term 
cover-up of fatal vehicle defects which finally ended in suspended prison terms for two 
former senior employees, and Akafuku, a famous confectioner in Mie Prefecture, was 
found guilty of passing goods as fresh in 2007. Such changing circumstances really require 
companies to make a substantial improvement in corporate compliance. With respect to 
the improvement of corporate compliance program, companies should endeavour to do 
this voluntarily regardless of legal requirements. However, companies are now legally 
required to structure a system to ensure the properness of their business activities under 
the new Companies Act. Besides, the amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law 
of 2006 requires companies to report on their internal controls for in-house reporting 
systems. Furthermore, the system to urge corporate compliance indirectly by protecting 
in-house whistleblowers was introduced in 2004. Turning to the AMA, a leniency pro-
gram, which is to exempt or reduce the surcharge payments for a voluntary reporter of 
its own violation, was introduced in 2005. The leniency program is expected not only to 
encourage self-reporting, but also to function as an incentive for companies to improve 
their compliance. These recent systemic revisions represent a strong call for the enhance-
ment of corporate compliance. However, specific methods for deploying a compliance 
program are left to each company’s own decision. From such viewpoint, it is vital that a 
company itself should endeavor to improve its compliance program. These revisions on 
basic laws will be explained in the next paragraphs.
  Firstly, the new Companies Act was enacted in April 2005 in order to correspond 
to recent needs of companies, such as strengthening corporate governance, and came 
into effect in May 2006. It comprehensively reviewed basic corporate systems such as 
minimum capital, formation of corporate bodies and responsibility of directors. It also 
requires companies to establish systems to secure the properness of corporate activities, 
which are so-called internal control systems. Under the new Act, the board of directors 
has an obligation to make decisions on the basic policy concerning the establishment of 
a system necessary to ensure compliance63. Although a new legal structure on corporate 
compliance was set up, the Companies Act does not stipulate any specific details on the 
basic policy, but leaves it to each company’s own judgment and decision. In order to 
establish an effective internal control system, a derivative action is expected to play an 
important role. A derivative action, which already existed under the former Commercial 
Code, is a measure for shareholders to pursue the liability of a director instead of a com-
pany in case that the company does not accept liability itself. If a huge fine is imposed 
on a company because of a violation of the AMA, shareholders of the company might 
bring a derivative action against the directors because the internal control is insufficient. 
When the directors are defeated in court, they must pay the amount of the fine which 39
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would cause them serious financial problems. There was already a famous Daiwa Bank 
case with a derivative action in which Osaka District Court ordered 12 directors to pay 
approximately 83 billion yen64. The existence of a derivative action can lead directors to 
seriously address the establishment of an effective control system. 
  The second is as regards financial statements, which are regulated under the Securi-
ties and Exchange Law, the cabinet office ordinance concerning disclosure of corporate 
information was revised in March 2006, and so companies are now required to report 
the situation of corporate governance in the ‘Reference Information of the Submitting 
Company’. Also, in December 2005 the Subcommittee on Internal Control under the 
Business Accounting Council released a report titled ‘On Standards for Evaluation and 
Audit of Internal Control concerning Financial Reporting’. In light of the above ordinance 
and report, the amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law was enacted in June 
2006 and as a result the internal control report was introduced as a mandatory report.65 
It is a legal requirement that a chartered accountant or an auditing firm should certify 
the internal control report of the audited company.
  The third is an enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Law. In recent years a 
string of corporate scandals were revealed, triggered by internal information disclosed by 
whistleblowers. Under such circumstances, the Whistleblower Protection Law was enacted 
in June 2004 for the purpose of prohibiting unfair treatment of a whistleblower, who 
is an employee of the accused company, including their dismissal. The Law took effect 
in April 2006. In July 2005 the Cabinet Office released the guidelines concerning the 
Whistleblower Protection Law. It says that a company should set up so-called ‘Helpline’ 
within the company to have its employee easily submit information to the company. It 
also suggests that it is desirable to place a compliance officer, who is a member of the 
management and takes responsible for the operation of the scheme. These guidelines 
were released for Whistleblower Protection Law, but they might be available for other 
laws including the AMA.   
Corporation Behaviour 
Let us examine how Japanese companies changed their behaviour after bringing the 
AMA into force. Firstly, let us consider a basic theory on how a company responds to 
monetary penalties; and secondly we shall examine actual corporate behaviour concern-
ing violations of the AMA. 
  It is frequently pointed out that the magnitude of penalties should be inflated from 
the level that would be appropriate if the possibility of detection is 100 per cent.66 Inflation 
of penalties is needed to compensate for the possibility that a violator will not detected. 40
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For example, if a company which makes a profit of one million dollars by participating in 
a cartel is detected at the possibility of 20 per cent, then the amount of a penalty should 
be one million dollar multiplied by five (1/0.2), or five million dollars. Accordingly, we 
can make a simple formula from the point of view of deterrence:
  S≥1/p·G or G≤p·S
  Where S=the amount of penalties
    p=the possibility of detection expected by a cartel participant
    G=illegal gains earned by a cartel participant
From the perspective of welfare economy, G should include social losses or dead-weight 
loss, but here G is smaller amount in order to mainly consider companies’ behaviour be-
cause companies might be considered to decide their conduct reflecting only overcharges, 
not social losses. G≤p·S means that illegal gains expected from a cartel are equal to the 
expectation value of penalties or are smaller than that. In this case, a company, which 
is assumed to be risk neutral, will determine not to participate in a cartel. Law makers 
should, accordingly, set S at the level that meets the formula S≥1/p·G. On the other hand, 
from the viewpoint of legal liability, the level of S should be limited even if p is extremely 
small. This is because a balance between the violation and the penalties imposed against 
it is legally required. For example, the United States and Australia limit the level of S to 
a couple of times illegal gains.
  S was considerably increased by the new AMA as follows: the basic rate is raised from 
six per cent to 10 per cent of the relevant turnover, and the highest rate of 15 per cent; 
1.5 times the basic rate of 10 per cent is applied to a company that repeated a violation. 
Some people still think that the rates of surcharges are too small because actual illegal 
gains may be much larger and other countries impose much higher fines. Certainly, the 
current rates are still low, but there are generally several penalties other than surcharges. 
First are criminal penalties. If a company is criminally investigated on the suspected 
violation of the AMA, the company has to worry about a monetary penalty up to 500 
million yen, the potential possibilities of prosecuting executives, and serious damage to 
reputation, in addition to surcharges. Unfortunately, these penalties were revised in the 
direction of relaxing, not strengthening them; an adjustment between criminal fines and 
surcharges was set up so that a half of criminal fines can be deducted from surcharges. 
In spite of introducing the adjustment, the actual impacts of criminal penalties includ-
ing reputation risk are so strong that the business community might want to integrate 
criminal penalties with administrative fines. Second are derivative actions. The AMA has 
a special provision that a representative can be criminally punished the same as persons 
who actually violated the AMA if he/she knows about the act in violation but does not 
prevent it, but this provision has not worked because there is no case where it applied. 41
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Practically, derivative actions have had a great impact on the business community as 
mentioned. Derivative actions may significantly affect companies’ behaviour in the future 
against the background that surcharges were considerably increased. Moreover, we have 
three penalties regarding bid rigging as already mentioned: suspension from participating 
in a public bidding, damage payment, and business suspension imposed by the MILT. 
They are so large that a company that violated the AMA may face a financial crisis if all 
of them, besides surcharges, are imposed on it.
  As long as a leniency program works well, p might be considered to be dramati-
cally increased. As the number of cartel participants is larger, a leniency program works 
better because the large number of participants makes it difficult to keep the cartel secret. 
In general, there are larger participants in bid rigging concerning public works than in 
other hard-core cartels like price fixing, and a leniency program is inclined to work well. 
Under a given legal system, p crucially depends on how the JFTC enforce the AMA. Since 
most Japanese think that the JFTC has actively enforced the AMA, owing to the recent 
criminal cases reported frequently by the media, it is possible that most of companies also 
think p is significantly increased. 
  In conclusion, regarding bid rigging, S and p were dramatically increased by revising 
the AMA, reviewing the tendering and contracting system, and strengthening enforce-
ment. In this case, G≤p·S is possibly realised. Regarding other hard-core cartels, p was 
certainly increased, but might be small because there has been recently no criminal case 
concerning other hard core cartels such as a price fixing and a leniency program might 
not work better than in a bid rigging case. S is also increased but is small too because 
surcharges alone are too small to deter cartels. Accordingly, G≤p·S might not be realised 
under the current circumstances.
  In the real world, there is some evidence of corporate behaviour being changed 
as to bid rigging, but no evidence as to other hard-core cartels. In recent bidding cases, 
contracted prices have been decreasing after around January 2006 when the new AMA 
took effect. It was reported that the rate of the contracted price to the planned ceiling 
price decreased from 91.1 per cent to 83.5 per cent.67 The Japan Federation of Bar As-
sociations was reported to have conducted a survey concerning the improvement of a 
bidding system in local governments.68 They defined ‘public works with high prices’ as 
those with the contracted prices more than 90 per cent of the planned ceiling prices. 
The rate of ‘public works with high prices’ to total public works was regarded as an 
index of improvement. As the rate is lower, the bidding system improved. The average 
rate in prefectural governments decreased around 14 points to 58.2 per cent in the first 
half of 2007 from the rate in 2006. The average rate in Ordinance-designated cities also 
decreased around 11 points to 47.3 in the first half of 2007. The rate in Miyazaki pre-42
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fecture decreased most, from 58.1 points to 24.8 per cent. The decrease of these figures 
may show that bid rigging has decreased. It has been argued that construction companies 
has faced stiff competition because bid rigging does not exist any more in major public 
work projects. In fact, the JFTC issued a warning, which was not a legal action but an 
administrative action, to five construction companies on 26 June 2007 because their acts 
may fall under ‘unjustifiably low price sales’ constituted ‘unfair trade practices’ of Article 
19 of the AMA, based on the fact that these companies offered such an unreasonably low 
price in bidding for a public works project that they would be a bid winner. 
The Current Status on Corporate Compliance with the AMA
In order to grasp actual state of measures taken by companies for improving their corpo-
rate compliance, the JFTC conducted a questionnaire survey covering 1696 companies 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) in January 2006, and released this result in 
May 2006.69 Let us introduce some of the key results below.
  Firstly, a number of companies have taken measures to improve corporate compli-
ance, such as setting up a helpline and a committee, but the practical effectiveness is not 
yet to be secured; while 86 per cent of the company have made a manual, 77 per cent have 
installed a helpline for their employees to consult about illegal actions, and 72 per cent 
have set up a compliance committee within the company to address compliance problems, 
68 per cent of the companies have made a manual after 2000, a helpline was never used 
as to violations of the AMA in 81 per cent of the companies set up a helpline, and the 
president assumed a position of chair in the compliance committee in 38 per cent of the 
companies which set up a committee. The survey also asked if the current compliance 
program practically effective; 69 per cent of the company answered that it was not.
  Secondly, for question that asked the most important factor of a defective compli-
ance, the common answer was as follows; 55 per cent of the companies answered the 
awareness of the top management, 15 per cent answered the creation of a manual and 
13 per cent answered the establishment of a monitoring organisation.
  Thirdly, training for employees and audits for each division are so important practi-
cally that the survey asked about them regarding the AMA. 44 per cent of the companies 
did not provide training programs about the AMA for their employees. 56 per cent did 
not generally conduct internal audits about the AMA and only seven per cent conducted 
internal audits in response to the revision of the AMA. The result showed that companies 
were not very serious about training and auditing under the AMA.
  In the above survey, the JFTC also undertook research concerning repeated viola-
tions of the AMA. The results showed that 77 companies (1.6 per cent) were repeated 43
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violators in 4,802 companies ordered to pay a surcharge payment twice and more from 
1995 to 2004. The ratio is not so high because the orders for surcharge payment were 
issued to a wide variety of companies. However, if 4,802 companies are limited to 123 
companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), the ratio rises from 1.6 per cent to 
13.8 per cent. This might be because the listed companies do such various business in wide 
geographical areas that they possibly make significant impact on the market, in addition 
to their compliance. Moreover, among 45 companies (24 listed on the TSE) participated 
in the recent major bid rigging concerning steel bridge projects, nine companies (20 per 
cent) violated the AMA repeatedly in the past 10 years and three companies violated the 
AMA three times. Nine companies are listed in all categories, accounting for 38 per cent 
of 24 listed companies. They are supposed to be treated with the highest surcharge rate 
of 15 per cent under the new AMA. These figures may show that even big companies do 
not give the first priority to compliance with the AMA. 
Enhancement of Compliance 
Although strict law enforcement can be achieved by the authorities, corporate compliance 
cannot be forcibly improved by its nature by the authorities so that a company must make 
a conscious effort to improve its compliance on its own initiative. A company must provide 
a compliance program for its employees including release of a compliance manual and 
establishing an organisational framework such as compliance committee. This should not 
be so difficult for a company to carry out since many companies have already implemented 
and publicised such regimes. However, the implementation of such a regime may not 
necessarily secure a substantial and effective compliance within a company. This is shown 
by the fact that a number of companies are repeat violators of the AMA even though 
they have implemented a compliance program. The result of the survey conducted by 
the JFTC also revealed companies’ awareness of the ineffectiveness of their compliance 
program. In order to secure an effective compliance program, a company, notably its top 
management, should take full responsibility for implementing its compliance program. A 
company is inclined to have only its employees take responsibility for violating the AMA 
considering the past violations. For example, it is said that a construction company has 
‘yogore-yaku’ (filth manager) in place for a dango for top management not to directly have 
a hand in it. 70 A company must always consider organisational responsibility, including 
top management’s, instead of having an employee bear responsibility.
  To secure a corporate compliance, a company must consider not only a compliance 
program but also organisational culture. It is naturally necessary for a company to comply 
with laws, but is not enough. It also needs to foster a corporate culture which fosters 44
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awareness of the importance of complying with laws among a company’s employees. If an 
employee notices there is any trade practice that impedes fair competition, the fact should 
be immediately reported to the top management and the company must get rid of it. It 
might be very difficult without a proper corporate culture to deal with unfair practices. 
The most important thing when finding out unfair practices is the clear declaration of 
management’s determination, inside and outside the company, to exclude unfair practices 
even if the company loses huge profit.
  As has been the case in the United States and other countries, the high level of 
financial penalties may contribute to the enhancement of a company’s internal control 
system by giving a great incentive for top management to improve its compliance. Japan 
has also significantly raised the rate of the surcharges, which is not 10 per cent but 15 
per cent for a big company that violated the AMA in the past, in an amendment to the 
AMA. It is expected to provide an incentive, together with other penalties, for a company 
to take serious measures to comply with the AMA. In order to promote a company’s ef-
forts to improve its compliance, the JFTC should assure that the AMA would be strictly 
enforced.
  On the other hand, to improve corporate compliance, a company should also 
develop an internal control system so that it will be able to find illegal violations by 
auditing regularly. It is also required under an appropriate internal control system that 
employees can easily report to top management when they notice an act in violation. In 
a case where an illegal act is identified, top management must report to the authorities. 
The new leniency program introduced in the AMA is expected to provide an incentive for 
a company to develop such a system. Leniency programs, which are generally included 
in other country’s anti-trust laws, are credited to have contributed much not only to the 
detection of illegal activities such as cartels and bid rigging, but also to the improvement 
of corporate compliance.
8 Conclusions
Japan imported an advanced and comprehensive anti-trust law, which is formally called 
the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade (the 
AMA) more than 60 years ago from the United States, which had developed anti-trust laws 
earlier than any other country. As the Sherman Act did, the AMA incorporated criminal 
penalties supposed to be a strictest penalty to prevent violations of the AMA. Unlike the 
US system, all the power to enforce the AMA was concentrated in the JFTC which was 
independent from political power and consisted of experts having deep knowledge of 
laws and economics. The AMA called ‘the Constitution of the Economy’ in Japan was 45
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set up as an ideal law, but did not work in reality as the law makers expected. Moreover, 
the government after the occupation revised the law to allow many exemptions from the 
AMA. 
  Until the oil cartel cases in 1974, there were virtually no cases where criminal 
sanctions were applied in Japan The oil cartel cases had such a huge impact on the 
then Japanese society that the AMA was reviewed to introduce surcharges, which were 
expected to prevent hard-core cartels more effectively than criminal sanctions, leaving 
criminal sanctions unchanged. In a sense, the introduction of surcharges resulted in stop-
ping criminal accusations because there were no criminal cases for 17 years after the oil 
cartel case. Moreover, the basic rate of surcharges was 1.5 per cent of relevant turnover, 
which was too low to prevent hard-core cartels. Even if a company pays the 1.5 per cent 
surcharge for a violation of the AMA, it might still earn a profit from a cartel and could 
simply view the surcharge as a cost of doing business. In light of these facts, it should 
be concluded that the AMA could not practically function to prevent hard-core cartels 
in spite of having surcharges. Under these circumstances, the United States again called 
on the Japanese government to address the structural impediments of Japan. As a result 
of the SSI talks, the Japanese government restarted criminally punishing violators of the 
AMA, and dramatically increased the basic rate four times from 1.5 per cent to six per 
cent. In fact, the anti-trust enforcement was activated much more than before the SSI, 
but still too weak to prevent hard core cartels because the basic rate of six per cent was 
too small and there were a quite few criminal cases. The AMA and its enforcement were 
so strengthened to prevent hard-core cartels after the SSI talks, but it was not enough.
  After the Koizumi Government took office, the staff of the JFTC significantly 
increased from 571 in 2001 to 795 in 2008, and the AMA was dramatically reviewed. 
Nowadays, the JFTC is not a small agency compared with other agencies such as the 
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) with 358 employees, and has 
a series of weapons to fight hard-core cartels; a leniency program; and criminal investiga-
tion powers. While the SESC has filed criminal referrals against 55 cases in five years from 
2002 to 2006, the JFTC has filed referrals against five cases in six years from 2002 to 
2007. Although it is difficult to compare with other agencies, five cases in six years might 
be considered to be too small. Fortunately, Japan has for a long time had both criminal 
penalties and administrative penalties in spite of the fact that other countries have recently 
introduced criminal penalties or made efforts to introduce them. Japan should take full 
advantage of the concurrence of two kinds of penalties so that hard- core cartels would 
be deterred effectively.
  Finally, to answer the question ‘Can the AMA of 2005 Change the Japanese Busi-
ness Community?’, my answer is ‘yes’, but it depends on the efforts of the JFTC from 46
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now on. I think bid rigging in Japan is now collapsing, but it can easily revive if companies 
feel detection is difficult. Regarding other hard-core cartels, they may still remain in the 
Japanese business community because there have been no criminal cases and penalties are 
not enough to destroy them. The following conclusions are suggested. First, the JFTC 
should investigate as many cases as it can by improving the productivity of the increased 
staff. Second, the JFTC should place first priority on criminal investigations in spite of 
the fact that it takes a great deal of resources to conduct them. 
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